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Abstract. The practice of social studies continues to be a complicated scientific endeavor. From an epistem-
ological point of view, the social sciences, unlike the natural sciences, do not conform to the predominant 
definition of science. The existing differences among expositions of “science,” “inquiry,” and “studies” lie with 
the contested role of the intellectual who is embarked on understanding the social realm. The “maturity” of the 
social sciences is usually discussed in the context of objectivity and rationality. But continuing epistemological 
debates would be insufficient without reference to the scholar as a human studying humans. The philosophy 
of science has focused mainly on the procedures of knowledge accumulation, neglecting social context and its 
implications for inquiry. To address this neglect, this essay sets out first to retrace doubts about the role of the 
scholar that emerged with the institutionalization of the social sciences at the outset of the twentieth century 
and then to rethink these issues in terms of recent scientific developments. What surfaces is a new, particip-
atory role for scholars that demands responsible contextualization and a broader conception of causal stories.
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Įsipainiojęs mokslininkas: objektyvumo problema  
socialiniuose tyrimuose 
Santrauka. Socialinės studijos išlieka prieštaringa moksline sritimi. Skirtingai nuo gamtos mokslų, socialiniams 
mokslams yra sunkiau pritaikyti vyraujančius mokslinius kriterijus. Apibrėžimų ir interpretacijų skirtumai 
„mokslo“, „tyrimų“ ir „studijų“ atvejais yra tiesiogiai susiję su nevienareikšmiu mokslinio tyrėjo vaidmeniu, 
ypač siekiant suprasti socialinę tikrovę. Socialinių mokslų branda paprastai vertinama objektyvumo ir racio-
nalumo kontekste. Tačiau nesibaigiantys epistemologiniai debatai gali prarasti savo vertę, jei nebus atsigręžta 
į mokslininką kaip į žmogų, tiriantį kitus žmones. Mokslo filosofija daugiausia koncentruojasi į žinojimo 
augimą, ignoruodama socialinį kontekstą ir jo įtaką tyrimams. Straipsnyje aptariamas socialinio mokslininko 
darbo problemiškumas, išlikęs nuo socialinių mokslų institucionalizacijos pradžios XX a. pirmojoje pusėje. 
Taip pat kritikuojamas besąlygiškas objektyvumo (nešališkumo) principų taikymas socialinėms studijoms, 
įžvelgiant pavojų epistemologinei pozicijai tapti socialiniu požiūriu.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: racionalumas, socialinis tyrimas, mokslo filosofija, įtraukimas
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Introduction
The words “scholar” and “social inquiry” have been deliberately chosen for the title of 
this paper. Their modern counterparts, “scientist” and “social science,” may seem more 
prominent in academic terms but are nonetheless controversial. A certain trend has come 
to the fore regarding the usage of these words that by and large connote the natural sci-
ences collectively as an exemplary model of scientific endeavor, a model that is the focus 
of this paper. The impressive success of Newtonian physics has set long-term scientific 
standards that include impersonal knowledge, “value-free” objectivity, and the articula-
tion of regular patterns. A pivotal principle of these standards has been the detachment 
of scientists as observers and researchers. The detachment was supposed to guarantee 
an impartial objectivity thus indicating the right way ‘to do science’. It has constituted a 
methodological framework used in social science since its institutionalization in univer-
sities at the end of the nineteenth century. Though, as the century that followed has not 
marked a final elaboration of social science, the application of scientific method in terms 
of attained detachment remains questionable in the social realm. 
Social science as such has become associated with industrialization from the nineteenth 
century, but it has never achieved the same success as natural science, “though many have 
tried.” As a result, social science has continued to drift between philosophy and the human-
ities on the one hand and natural science on the other. However, a mechanistic approach, 
with relevant cause-effect relations, has still been extensively applied in social studies that 
do not qualify for the comprehensive exploitation of available options. Meanwhile, many 
interesting developments have taken place in the natural sciences as well, e.g., in physics, 
with the result that Newtonian physics is no longer the only exemplary mode of scientific 
inquiry. This paper discusses a complete unattainability of detachment in social inquiry, 
hereby positioning a scholar in non-isolated (entangled) setting. It is not possible to cover 
the majority of social disciplines within the scope of this paper, so it has referred mainly 
to economics due to its representational status (as ‘queen of social sciences’). Economics, 
as one of the oldest ‘established’ social disciplines, enables to reconsider epistemological 
problems both in historical and social context. Therefore, it can provide with some relevant 
insights for the broader discussion in regard to the problem of detachment. 
Certainly, scholars had been always ‘entangled’ before the term ‘entanglement’ entered 
quantum physics. The major problem with studying the social realm is defined by the 
sheer impossibility of impartial knowledge. In other words, positivism applies only to a 
limited degree to social reality, even if its mode of “slicing” the object of study to retrieve 
quantitative data is claimed to be comprehensive. The detachment of scientists is an ideal-
ized notion that in many cases is not even completely adhered to in the natural sciences. 
For example, sometimes taking a measurement literally requires the intervention of the 
observer, as in quantum and particle physics. Since the definition of observation is not 
fixed, the notion of objectivity itself is rather inconsistent. The upshot is that scholars are 
more than just scientists—they are intellectuals, who are not controlled by the technical 
functions and standard procedures imposed by the scientific framework. To begin with, 
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they must be sensitive to ethical issues and societal needs, which is not as superficial a 
declaration as it may seem. 
On the Verge of troubled times
The statement by Rorty (2016: 24) that “there was no intellectual struggle comparable in 
scale to the warfare between science and theology” between 1600 and 1900 stimulates 
some troubling thoughts concerning the twentieth century and beyond. Its material and 
technological achievements have been strongly associated with the scientific method and 
rationality. On the one hand, the quest for a universal framework was a basic precondi-
tion of the scientific project (Wallerstein 1996: 3) with an ambitious promise to extract 
some rationality from the so-called non-scientific cluster of values. However, a clash of 
ideologies has displaced the warfare between science and religion, leaving the issue of 
rationality no less complicated. The autonomy of science has continued to be defined 
in relative terms, especially in the case of the social sciences. This is a hallmark of the 
twentieth century—politics pervading science and vice versa. The relation between these 
two has become a special kind of entanglement indicative, both implicitly and explicitly, 
of a new pattern of research within the social realm.
Following the first industrial revolution, a scientific capacity to predict and control 
processes has been placed in the service of engineering power. The need for newly emerged 
nation-states to consolidate and manage social transformations has invoked a technical and 
deterministic approach within the social sciences. This marks a certain point of divergence 
between scientific and intellectual outlooks, which is no less significant than the preceding 
split between philosophy and the sciences. The present suggestion is that scholars should 
aspire to re-evaluate the restrictions imposed by methods, thereby moving toward resum-
ing social inquiry in a broader context than the notion of “discipline” allows. Despite the 
ubiquitous nature of impressive developments, the sense of stasis is still prevalent in the 
ivory tower of social knowledge. This is certainly not a winning stance. 
In some sense, science can be nominated as the successor to the theological tradition 
since it claims a monopoly on knowledge of Being. On the other hand, theology readily 
assumes the scientific foundations of religion, thus preserving the status of a faculty 
discipline in some Western universities (which philosophy, by default, cannot frequently 
afford). From a historical perspective, a “purification” mechanism by means of the sci-
entific method has not, at least in the social field, proven to be reliable by sustaining a 
framework of rational values of its own throughout the twentieth century. It is rewarding 
to compare certain intellectual fluctuations in the context of this dispute. Dewey (1929), 
while dismissing traditional metaphysics, put his faith in the industrial economy and ex-
perimental scientific method; Dyson (2006), at the end of the twentieth century, admitted 
the relevance of religious values to the growth of scientific knowledge. However, first 
and foremost, these authors shared a common sentiment regarding the role of science 
and scientists in terms of society and social responsibility. Dewey and Dyson rejected a 
grand universal framework based on privileged access to “pure” rationality cleansed of 
social and moral values. Equally, they dismissed the perspective of an idealized outside 
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spectator (be it God or a “detached” observer) and the unique authority of science in the 
search for new knowledge.
Even though the demand for adequate policy advice is growing, the social sciences 
possess a limited set of research tools that mainly rely on modeling and statistical databases. 
This means that social knowledge has necessarily been accumulated from experience as 
well, including dead ends and mistakes, though not everyone is willing to take advantage 
of these. For example, the mentality of “let bygones be bygones” is still evident in the 
economic mental outlook for ideological and methodological reasons (Stiglitz 2010). 
The ideal of detachment has been disconnected from social reality, much as a religious 
sentiment might be. If social inquiry is to be newly approached, social interests and ethical 
considerations must become an inseparable part of a research program (or paradigm) that 
is liberated from misleading and reductionist “rational agents.”
For the benefit of the Service
Shortly after the social sciences were established in universities at the end of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth centuries (Wagner 2001), it became obvious that social 
complexity could not be surrendered to the engineering ambitions of the industrialization 
epoch. The newly emerged nation-states needed a sophisticated tool for administrative 
statecraft, something that had been realized since long before nineteenth-century in-
dustrialization. At that time, a basic principle of experimental science propounded by 
Bacon delivered a new promise “to tame a Nature.” The much-appreciated success of 
the predictive capacity of the physical sciences had stimulated the governing elites to 
believe that they could ‘tame’ a social and political order. That shift in thinking had been 
premised on the expected transposition of lawlike regularities from the physical to the 
social realm by assuming certain similarities between the two, an assumption that paved 
the way for the social sciences. 
Not surprisingly, the first theoreticians and practitioners of social sciences also oc-
cupied administrative positions (Hirschman 1997, Wallerstein 1996). This became quite 
an influential trend, sometimes referred to as “mandarinization,” which survived into 
the era of imperial Germany. Although the compresence of scholars and administrators 
in one person can be traced back to Ancient China, it is unnecessary to go back so far 
to find examples. The obligation to supply “policy advice” has led to a peculiar list of 
requirements for scholars—who are forced, sometimes unaware, to make conflicting meth-
odological, professional, and moral choices during their inquiries. These contradictions 
are usually resolved by “rationalizing” hidden bias within a formal framework (Myrdal 
1944). A “disinterested social science,” according to Myrdal, “never existed, and it never 
will exist” (1944: 1064).
Meantime, the philosophy of science has always struggled with the so-called immaturity 
of the social sciences (Kuhn 1996 [1962], Lakatos 1999 [1976], Popper 2008 [1963]). The 
introduction into economics, the “queen” of the social sciences, of mathematical models 
with linear equations did not complete its maturation. Once the professionalization of the 
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sciences has gained momentum, there has always remained an open question regarding 
the application of the results of scientific research in terms of the common good. Natural 
scientists can perform as many experiments as necessary, but social theorists do not have 
this privilege. Social complexity obliges scholars to be as empathetic and sensitive as 
possible in making socially responsible methodological choices. Although they are not 
building a new weapon of mass destruction, the consequences of an ill-advised choice 
can be just as devastating.
Modelling (Molding?) the Social
The 2008–2009 financial market collapse revealed how much damage could be done by 
delusional misunderstanding and misappropriation of rational-agent–based modeling. 
Models may be useful for studying and understanding social reality, but they cannot re-
place reality itself. Even today, the arrogant behavior of many financial institutions, such 
as banks, is beyond rational limits. Allegedly, economic processes are modeled in terms 
of objective and accurate analyses, but banks are understandably dissatisfied with the 
tools available. They aspire to tame uncertainty by shaping public opinion, and not only 
through financial education programs. A significant amount of effort is made to influence 
the behavior of consumers by designing schemes. Furthermore, instead of sharing expert 
knowledge, bank economists frequently function as public-relations specialists by publicly 
propagating certain attitudes. Without interference from external regulatory institutions 
such activities result in “closed-loop” thinking and acting. In this case, the model is not 
intended to correspond to reality; instead, the reality is coerced into complying with the 
model. 
Ironically, economists are famous for trying to personify “rational agents” (Stiglitz 
2010: 249), not to mention for their regular efforts to convert others. This behavior is 
reminiscent of the practices of a religious community. As Redman (1993: 176) observed, 
“it has been forgotten that economics in both England and the United States grew out of 
religion.” This refers to historical findings that many early economists were clergymen 
(in the UK) and former or practicing ministers (in the USA). Later, the authority to preach 
and to rationalize social order became entrenched in the political realm as well. The re-
demption and the amelioration of the human condition are two sides of the same coin—the 
postponed (or lost) ideal of final achievement yet to be actualized. However, this approach 
can introduce transgression of a set of values, especially via the ideological dimension, 
which is oriented towards the subordination of reality to the worldview aspired to. 
Social reality is both an indispensable object and conditional context of research, what 
delivers the interesting results of intersecting scientific, political, and social dimensions. 
However, scientific and political mentalities have in common the deficiency of egocentri-
city, be it methodological or political. Although such a focused approach is, of course, 
an effective way to foster the professional career of a scientist or politician, it is valid 
mainly within an institutional framework or, as Bourdieu (2004) put it, a “scientific field 
of forces.” Mathematical models were supposed to safeguard the autonomy of scientific 
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endeavor because they were expected to provide the necessary isolation from incompet-
ent political influence (Redman 1993: 156) or excessive entry fees for amateurs seeking 
access to the “scientific field” (Bourdieu 2004: 48). Mathematics appears to have been 
overestimated as a guarantor of scientific clarity and certainty in the social sciences. This 
is because, firstly, numbers lend themselves well to expressing political opinions, as does 
every other rhetorical device sooner or later. Secondly, the “gatekeeper” has become more 
of a problem than a solution by encouraging the entrance of many scientists from applied 
mathematics into the social sciences, as in the case of economics (Leontief 1982). It echoes 
the observation of Bourdieu (2004: 115) that “social science will never come to the end 
of the efforts to impose itself as a science.” 
The current challenges (of both social and natural origins) do not conform to “business 
as usual” and require a new way of thinking, a new kind of mentality that can be better 
represented than by the figure of a typical scientist. This is a common finding for learned 
and educated people—the conventional scientific attitude has become excessively im-
mersed in specialization. Humanity is subjected to the pressures of complex, overlapping 
issues, such as pandemics, liberal democracy under attack, insufficient global governance, 
climate change, and economic crises. This extensive interconnectedness renders abstract 
modeling and the idea of detachment insufficient to ground comprehensive social studies 
or adequate policy advice. A concise intellectual itinerary that includes critical self-re-
flection and public commitment should enable a scholar to become a full-fledged agent 
of social reforms. This would result in abandonment of the position artificially created 
for detached observation, which is implicitly subordinated to a network of complicated 
political relations.
The Insufficiency of detachment 
A perennial discussion about the “maturity” and “immaturity” of the social sciences turns 
out to be unproductive. “The very distinction implies that the social sciences can develop 
exactly as the natural” (Redman 1993: 174). The same author has emphasized that not 
even Popper goes as far as that, despite his inconsistencies and reservations. Social inquiry 
can be improved by following an alternative path without loss of high-quality scholarship. 
The aim of this approach is not to place the scholar between opposing perspectives and 
reject possible standards of inquiry but rather to induce the scholar to face the problem 
of distortions in social inquiry. The best way to handle bias is to declare it transparently 
and expose it to criticism. Redman, in the same manner, insists that objectivity does 
not presume being “cleansed of all predilections,” “rather, objectivity comes about by 
exposing our theories, ideas, and beliefs so that they may be criticized, corrected, and 
bettered” (1993: 133). The unattainability of complete objectivity is redeemed by two 
major implications for social inquiry: 1) the whole scientific endeavor can be understood 
as a “systematic inquiry” without any methodological exceptions (Backhouse 1998: 
123), and 2) the relevance of interpretation can be acknowledged because “all sciences, 
including the natural ones, are interpretive” (Addleson 1995: 16). 
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The projection of the social sciences had implied the control and prediction of social 
changes. A social dimension of knowledge (Hoover 2003: 244) has been intertwined with 
a political one, since social processes can be directed (managed, manipulated, etc.). Des-
pite the widespread belief that science, operating as it does on solid ontological premises, 
ensures continuity and certainty in the context of contingencies, moments of unpredictable 
bifurcation occur. A certain demarcation line may be aspired to delineate the scholar in 
the context of the society and inquiry itself. Abstraction is the most common way to dis-
sociate the object of inquiry from intermittent distortions. However, when human beings 
are involved, these appearances may be misleading.
Even though statistical data and calculations are supposed to provide decision makers 
with a coherent and concise picture of reality, the accumulation of collected data may 
lead to such aggregated fictional entities as the averages. The averages then become 
established ‘political and social facts’ studied by the ‘political and social sciences.’ It is 
a cult of fact that makes political passions take on a special form of “divinized realism” 
(Benda 2009 [1928]: 36). Benda was concerned less about “the treason of intellectuals” 
than about the assimilation of intellectual reasoning into a so-called practical experience 
that seeks to apply knowledge. The problem is that social studies cannot be as exact as 
the natural sciences. For example, Hausman has tried “to save” economics by admitting 
its inexactness, affirming that “it is only supposed to be complete at a high level of ab-
straction or approximation” (1992: 93) and that “economics resembles individual theor-
ies such as Newtonian dynamics or Mendelian population genetics more closely than it 
resembles disciplines such as physics or biology” (1992: 95). Economics is supposed to 
be an exemplary social science that employs the scientific method, but its initial premises 
are irrelevant to actual economic and political issues (Holland 2015). Its dependence on 
rationality and methodological individualism just strengthens criticisms of human beings 
as rational agents possessing perfect information (Stiglitz 2010). 
The “divinized realism” promotes a fatalistic and deterministic worldview wherein 
human beings are subjected to the unilateral influence of alleged “social laws or other 
unavoidable regularities.” The yearning of Benda for the noble status of intellectuals 
may be disregarded, but the rise of the new “aristocracy,” i.e., the experts, should not be 
neglected. Not only do they tend to hold a monopoly on expertise in technical (practical) 
matters, but their rise has also introduced the idea that the “production of knowledge” 
needs to be “managed properly.” Russell (1956), one of the greatest protagonists of 
science, warned of the threat to intellectual freedom. “Thus, the practical experts who 
employ scientific technique, and still more the governments and large firms which employ 
the practical experts, acquire a quite different temper from that of the men of science, 
i.e., a temper full of a sense of limitless power, of arrogant certainty, and of pleasure 
in manipulation even of human material” (Russell 1956: 245). Russell distinguished 
scientists from experts and admitted that the latter are more likely to flourish as a result 
of scientific reasoning. 
Nowadays, groups of scientists and experts are so similar in profession and affiliation 
that it is often practically impossible to distinguish between them. Accordingly, Russell’s 
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notion of scientific temper remains an unfulfilled aspiration, an ideal to seek after or a 
formal standard to strive for. Knowledge about the social realm has been compartment-
alized into incommensurable fields that are more easily dominated by a monopoly of ex-
pertise or by certain interest groups. Thus, social scientists have become more vulnerable 
to alienating themselves from the notion of scientific temper and society in general than 
ever. A truly scientific method cannot exclusively sustain the criteria of universality and 
objectivity in social research. The reduction of normativity to a finite set of initial premises 
is counterproductive in the attempt to understand social complexity.
The Modern preoccupation with linearity
It is important to reassess the ideas of evolution, progress, and development, which are 
frequently key concepts in describing and explaining social transitions over time. “The 
idea of progress is of modern rather than ancient date” (Hertzler 1965 [1922]: 101). 
Only since the second half of the nineteenth century has the idea of progress become “a 
general article of faith” (Bury 1920). Industrial development in the nineteenth century 
induced extreme societal changes that had to be addressed out of the necessity to preserve 
a political order. The success of the physical sciences in “taming a Nature” had extended 
the scope of the scientific method. “Social science is a concept that was invented quite 
recently, only in the 19th century” (Wallerstein 2000: 161). Mechanistic reasoning relies 
mainly on a linear perception of reality—a transition from one stage to another in a con-
trolled and predictable fashion based on premises specified in advance. The combination 
of cause-effect reasoning and the urgent necessity to establish safeguards against social 
tensions has produced modern forms of social engineering which have had tremendous 
implications during the twentieth century. 
While Benda denounced political ideologies as “divinized realisms” and preferred 
metaphysical permanence beyond a succession of “historical” states, Wolfe insisted on 
looking “nowhere else than to science to dispel the mystical, metaphysical, nationalistic, 
class, and narrow-egotistical illusions that still stand in the way of our sensing a rational 
direction in which collectively to guide human evolution” (1923: 306). Wolfe had expec-
ted that the applicability of the scientific method in the social realm would amplify the 
scientific attitude into a “generalized behavior-pattern.” According to him, the scientific 
method is the best possible way to rationalize conflicts between political interests. “The 
scientific attitude rests upon one, and only one, fundamental article of faith—faith in 
the universality of cause and effect” (Wolfe 1923: 215-216). It comes as no surprise 
that the scientific attitude in this sense enters into close association with liberalism since 
both are positioned between reactionism (as longing for the past state of society which 
is non-existent already) and radicalism (as seeking the possible state of society which is 
not yet achievable). This comparison may appear (and probably is) simplistic because our 
times demand more sophisticated typologies. However, it is hard not to wonder whether 
both, science and liberal democracy, have entered (or perhaps never left) a mode of crisis 
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because the scientific method applied between already and not yet does not necessarily 
yield reliable results concerning social complexity.
Wolfe was not so naïve as to rely entirely on deterministic science and mechanistic 
psychology. What makes his approach still relevant for today’s discussion is the notion 
of sympathy as “an indispensable aid to scientific observation, where human beings and 
their motives are involved” (Wolfe 1923: 312). “Sympathetic insight” and the ethical 
dimension have still not been accommodated properly within the scientific framework. 
Wolfe’s imagined society of rational agents could be a universal template for introducing 
social well-being and predictability—a perfect match of social reality and scientific mod-
eling. However, critical thinking and the sciences have a complicated relationship, which 
may be identical to the problematic relationship between education and indoctrination. 
Ortega y Gasset (1950 [1930]) warned that the increased specialization characteristic 
of modern science allowed the “average man” to enter this field with success. As he im-
plied, the same mechanization as seen in industrialization divided scientific activity into 
separate technical functions, which could be performed with “commonplace” intellectual 
merits. In this sense, specialization reproduces a self-satisfied mentality within certain 
limitations that cannot support further progress. “The specialist ‘knows’ very well his 
own, tiny corner of the universe; he is radically ignorant of all the rest” (Ortega y Gas-
set 1950 [1930]: 81). Benda, Wolfe, and Ortega y Gasset express a shared concern but 
distinct suggestions for intellectuals encountering “layman passions,” “popular mind,” 
or the “average man.” In general, their critical sensitivity remains valid today despite an 
obvious inclination to elitist detachment in hopes of securing a safe harbor for “higher” 
values. The alternative would be to reconsider a participatory social inquiry, thus revisiting 
the latest developments in natural sciences.
Non-reducible Intermezzo
A once popular guide for “young academic politicians” (Cornford 1908) supplied satir-
ical career advice for prospective fellows. As they say, advice under academic auspices 
is never in short supply. Besides recommending the reputation-building method of “sit 
tight and drink port wine,” this guide introduced (among several others) the “Principle 
of Unripe Time,” the rule of inaction always denouncing the idea that the present might 
be the right moment to act. Every “decent” academic fellow must adhere to certain rules 
of inactivity and keep obstructing alternative proposals. In this context, Cornford (1908) 
inserted the sardonically revealing remark that “time…has a trick of going rotten before 
it is ripe.” This thought may have some bearing on the issue of the application of the 
scientific method within the social realm. 
Barrow (2007: 15) has pointed out that it was the Judeo–Christian perspective that 
induced the now dominant way of cutting reality into pieces and studying the wholeness 
through its constituent parts. That perspective makes possible a linear approach focused on 
transitional processes from one state to another and involving predictive and manipulative 
powers. This is not to imply that modern science and Christianity were directly interrelated, 
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though many prominent precursors of modern science, like Boyle, Newton, and Maxwell, 
were deeply religious. According to Barrow (2007), other religious sentiments have also 
participated in building a scientific framework, although not on an equal basis. The Eastern 
holistic perspective and its contribution to the understanding of non-linear processes has 
been appreciated only recently and thanks to improved computational capacities. Barrow 
(2007) attempted to balance Western and Eastern “approaches” by making the studies 
of linear and non-linear processes complementary, reliant on each other’s achievements. 
Reduction as a scientific procedure has been used to construct a unified Theory 
of Everything by reducing physics to a basic set of constants, in parallel to Russell’s 
method of reducing mathematics to basic logical propositions (Barrow 2007: 115). The 
promise of a Theory of Everything had included the refinement and simplification of 
existing knowledge. But the symmetry of physical laws and the beauty of mathematical 
equations do not fit a complex reality that is simply “messy,” though they are at the heart 
of efforts to reconcile that knowledge. As indicated by Barrow (2007: 138), we do not 
observe laws of Nature directly—we just observe their outcomes. Likewise, we do not 
observe mathematical equations as representations of Nature and its laws—we merely 
have the use of their solutions. This implies that laws and mathematical solutions do not 
necessarily manifest symmetry, e. g., in quantum mechanics: “outcomes are much more 
complicated than laws; solutions much more subtle than equations” (Barrow 2007: 138). 
It is no coincidence that reduction has been a key procedure in two extreme poles of the 
scientific inquiry: astronomy and the physics of elementary particles. These disciplines 
have still been trying to preserve the status of “fundamental” ones, clinging to the promise 
of a “unified theory.” But there exists an intermezzo (or meso) world of complexity oc-
cupied by “messy” human beings—a case full of symmetry-breaking. Social complexity 
cannot be reduced to definite parts and viewed simply as their sum while searching for 
ultimate explanations at the lower level. Non-reducible social systems with emergent 
properties have induced new perspectives in terms of causality and determinism (Byrne 
1998, Ormerod 2009).
Cluster Causality
Quantum mechanics has revolutionized physics since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. Contrary to popular beliefs, it did not completely abolish the Newtonian framework 
nor finally settle the issue of indeterminacy. Quantum systems evolve according to the 
deterministic Schrödinger equation if no interference via measurements is attempted. 
The interference of measurement has remodeled the scientifically “fixated” position of a 
detached observer in favor of a participatory model. The possible implications for social 
sciences have been addressed since the emergence of quantum mechanics as a scientific 
discipline (Dewey 1929). The non-locality of quantum systems has redefined causality 
relations through the notion of entanglement. As emphasized by Weinert (2005: 258), 
causation has become “a cluster concept: if at least a majority of its features are satisfied, 
then we are entitled to speak of a causal situation.” 
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Philosophical reflection on the developments of quantum mechanics has introduced 
a new concept of causation without classical determination, which is relevant for social 
inquiry as well. Social scientists have always been accustomed to working with sets of 
most likely factors as the causes of events (Weinert 2005: 249). Every kind of inquiry 
explores regularities, dependencies, and patterns; this is a common way to understand 
physical and social realities. And for this purpose, a certain model of causation has always 
been in demand. The overwhelming mathematization of the sciences “strongly encour-
aged the identification of the notion of causation with that of predictive determinism” 
(Weinert 2005: 259). The positivist ideal of value-free science did not manage to tame 
bias; interests could be safely harbored in the language of mathematics. However, parti-
cipatory inquiry has reintroduced human agency into the process of research otherwise 
restrained by hyper-rationality. The proposal to redefine scholarship and social inquiry 
is not motivated by “anti-scientific” sentiment. Causation made compatible with chance 
delivers the conditional model of causation as a plausible alternative to classic mechanics. 
This model implies that some causal conditions may be necessary/dependent and others 
sufficient/independent. In other words, Weinert (2005), following quantum mechanics, 
has philosophically reinterpreted the conditional view of causation as incomplete but with 
the advantage of adaptability. Now it is up to entangled scholars, having assumed the role 
of the responsible intellectual, to introduce duly contextualized and viable causal stories.
Conclusion
The scientific detachment is completely unattainable notion in social inquiry. The social 
studies have been reciprocally entangled within social realm: a) detachment does not 
automatically imply freedom and objectivity of research; b) social inquiry is not distanced 
from the potential involvement with the object of study. The paper was not intended to 
stigmatize bias nor to search for new ways to avoid distorted results of social inquiry. It 
is rather an invitation to rethink how firmly scholars are entangled in the social context. 
The main problem with scientific detachment is its capacity to shift from epistemological 
stance to social attitude.
The human ambition to identify itself with detached omniscience may be detected in 
anticipated forms of societal “perfections” at the “end of history.” Directional and progress-
ive development is supposed to ameliorate the human condition according to entrenched 
idealizations projected into the future. The existing hyper-rational idealized models are 
aimed at sustaining the notion of general agreement on the level of metaphysical certainty, 
as logical forms and mathematical equations do. These intellectual devices allegedly 
help distinguish the imperfections of reality and provide possible solutions. But austere 
scientific mentalities are prone to constructing automated chains out of initial premises 
and syllogisms, leaving human agency aside. 
There is a dangerous and still widespread misconception that liberal democracy is 
something given which evolves in automated fashion. It needs to be addressed otherwise 
why the phantom of the 1930s keeps us haunting? Social complexity has to be approached 
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in attentive and responsible way. This path should be pursued by scholars who fully recog-
nize the subtlety of entanglement with the social processes under study as both a challenge 
and an opportunity in leaving behind the observational position of omniscient spectators. 
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